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Abstract
 
-
 
Tate Pairings on Elliptic curve Cryptography are 
important because they can be used to build efficient Identity-
Based Cryptosystems, as well as their implementation 
essentially determines the efficiency of cryptosystems. In this 
work, we propose an identity-based encryption based on Tate 
Pairing on an elliptic curve. The scheme was chosen cipher
 
text security in the random oracle model assuming a variant of 
computational problem Diff  Hellman.  This paper provides 
precise definitions to encryption schemes based on identity, it 
studies the construction of the underlying ground field, their 
extension to enhance the finite field arithmetic and presents a 
technique to accelerate the time feeding in Tate pairing 
algorithm.
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I.
 
INTRODUCTION
 
he advent of asymmetric encryption represented a 
great advances in safety of computers, especially 
because it solved the problem of key exchange 
algorithms for symmetric encryption. But attacks have 
been taking
 
the
 
advantage of the fact that it does not 
have a guarantee on who and the true owner of a public 
key, so that a user can impersonate another easily
 
by
 
making
 
use of a
 
necessary mechanism of association 
between a public key and its owner.
 
To resolve this problem was created the 
mechanism of certified digital, that uses a hierarchical 
structure of certifying authorities, able to ensure properly 
the possession of a given public key. This mechanism 
works very well in open organizations such as the 
internet.
 
In 1984 a model-based cryptographic identities 
was proposed by Shamir [1].  This model was intended 
to prevent the use of Digital Certificates, using the 
identity of the user as its public key. This identity could 
be an address of e-mail, Social Security number, full 
name, or a combination is of these elements. The 
private key would be obtained through a trusted third 
party(TA -
 
trust authoraty).  With this, digital certificates 
would be necessary only in identification of this central 
authority, drastically reducing their use. A problem that 
exists in this idea
 
is the knowledge of the private key by 
the central authority, needed a total expectations by the 
user, which requires a lot of care from practical and 
legal point of view. 
On the other hand, does not need the entire 
infrastructure of hierarchical authorities for the 
management  of the keys by making the model more 
simple and suitable for organizations where hierarchy 
and its limitations are well controlled. 
Shamir developed a signature scheme based on 
identities, whose operation is similar to the RSA. He also 
speculated on the existence of a scheme that has a 
problem that has been solved in practice by the 
cryptosystem of Boneh and Franklim [2], whose safety 
has been rigorously demonstrated. 
a) Signature Scheme Based on Identities of Shamir  
The signature scheme of Shamir based on 
Identities and all other forms of encryption based on 
identities, being divided into four steps: 
1. Setup: this step and held by authority of 
expectations to generate the global parameters of 
the system and the master key, which will underpin 
that only the TA can generate private keys. 
2. Generation of private key: this algorithm receives as 
input the master key and the identity of a user, 
returning the associated private key. 
3. Signature: given a private key and a message, the 
algorithm returns the signature. 
4. Checking: given an identity, a message and a 
signature, the algorithm returns true if the signature 
of that message matches the identity supplied, and 
returns false if contradicts. 
II. INTRODUCTORY CONCEPTS 
a) Security   
We will now define some important issues to 
determine the security of an algorithm based on an 
additive group, as is the case of elliptic curves 
encryption [4]: 
• Problem of discrete logarithm: Given Q = nP, 
determine n. 
• Problem Computational Diffie-Hellman: Three Data 
points P, aP, bP, determine abP. 
•  Problem of decision Diffie-Hellman: Four Data 
elements P, aP, bP and cP belonging to a group G, 
answer true if and only if C≅ ab(Mod #G). 
T
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One of the first uses of pairings was made by 
Joux [5]. In this article he showed how the decision has 
to be taken to issue the Diffie-Hellman can be easy 
through the bilinear maps, thus managed to produce an 
application for key sharing among three parties in a 
single round. 
b) Elliptic Curves  
An elliptic curve E defined over a finite field Fpm  
and a set of points P = (x, y) with x,y ϵ Fpm such that y2 
+ a1 xy+a3y +a2  = x3 + a2x2 + a4x + a6 (standard 
medium Weiers trass) for ai ϵ  Fpm there, beyond the 
point at infinity, denoted by ∞. 
Setting up an operation in an appropriate sum, 
the elliptic curve form an additive Abelian group with 
neutral element given by the point at infinity. 
An operation widely used in elliptic curve 
cryptography and scalar multiplication, where a point P 
and coupled with it own times k to k ϵ Z. A point of order 
positive integer this property. 
III. IDENTITY-BASED ENCRYPTION 
 
Is the public key is predetermined (equal to the 
identity), and then calculate the secret key ? The answer 
to this question comes with the first model of security 
assumptions: there is a CA, with the following main 
responsibilities: 
• Create and maintain safe custody of a secret master 
key SAC   
• Identify and record all users of the system  
• Calculate the secret keys of the users  
• Deliver the secret keys securely (with confidentiality 
and authenticity) 
In 1984, Shamir described the model and 
algorithms for digital signature. It took almost two 
decades until efficient encryption algorithms were 
discovered and demonstrated for the identity -based 
model to create interest among researchers and 
industry. 
For comparison, in Table 1, we see that the 
secret key is calculated according to the secret system 
of authority and the user's identity. For a convenient f, it 
is not feasible to recover the master key from the ID 
values. And just the authority is able to generate secret 
keys, so that secret itself is a guarantee that the use of 
ID will work in cryptographic operations involving the 
owners identity. 
To encrypt a message to the owner ID or verify 
a signature ID, user ID using the identity over the public 
parameters of the system, They include the public key of 
the authority (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 : Encrypting the model based on the identity 
Table 1 :  Attributes of cryptographic identity -based 
public key style 
Secret key 
 
Public 
key 
 
Warranty 
 
S= f (ID, SAC ) ID S 
 
 
 
 
Calculated by the authority 
and chosen by the user or 
shared with the user 
 
Chosen 
by the 
user or 
shared 
with the 
user 
formatted 
for 
authority 
 
To decrypt a message to ID or to create a 
signature, the secret key ID is required. 
a) Advantages  
The identity -based model is attractive because 
it has many interesting advantages. The first is that the 
public key can in most cases be easily remembered by 
humans. Very different from the conventional public key, 
which is usually a binary string with hundreds or 
thousands of bits?  The identity can be informed by the 
user to their partners and there is no requirement to 
maintain key directories. 
To be able to view the saving processing time, 
storage costs and data transmissions, we will recall, for 
example, as It is generally a cryptographic operation 
with PCI. If Bob wants to encrypt a message to Alice, 
first of all, he must obtain the certificate that was issued 
to Alice (consulting a public directory or Alice itself). Bob 
needs check the validity period and the signature 
contained in the certificate. The signature verification is a 
process that sometimes runs the certification path of the 
certifying authorities involved in the hierarchy until they 
reach the root certification authority. If nothing goes 
wrong, Bob can save the Alice certificate for future use. 
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n such that an extent NP = ∞ and n the smallest 
The central idea of the public key cryptographic 
system based on Identity is very simple, because of the 
fact that the public key is a numeric value without explicit 
direction and which can be calculated from string of any 
significance?. In [ 1], it was proposed that the public key 
can be the user's identity, such as name , email 
address, social security number, cell phone number, IP 
address, serial number of electronic devices, etc.
However, before each use, Bob need to consult a 
validation authority to verify that the certificate has not 
been revoked (often, a referral to a server that is online). 
Once the certificate is valid and not revoked, Bob 
extracts the public key of Alice, encrypts the message 
and transmits. 
In identity-based model, just if the system para- 
meters are authentic Bob can encrypt a message based 
on the identity of Alice and send (considering that identi- 
ty withdrawal is treated as explained below). 
A peculiarity of identity -based model is that the 
public key can be used before the secret key calcula- 
tion. Thus, it is possible to encrypt a message for those 
who have not registered with the system authority or has 
secret key for decryption. In contrast to the model based 
on certificates, the user must first register and get the 
certificate, and then to receive an encrypted message 
under your public key. 
b) Disadvantages  
The first disadvantage, which is characteristic of 
identity-based systems is the custody of keys. As 
explained above, the system authority has the ability to 
generate secret keys of all users under their 
responsibility. This implies that the authority reaches to 
the level of confidence that defined in [10]. 
Consequently, you can decrypt any encrypted texts that 
have access (if you can identify the recipient's identity). 
You can also sign on behalf of any user and there is no 
irreversibility guarantee. Therefore, it is essential that the 
system of authority is reliable enough for eavesdropping 
of shares or counterfeiting as these are controllable. 
Custody of property keys, referenced by key 
escrow in English texts is not always undesirable. Within 
a company , for example, if all sensitive documents and 
data are encrypted by the employee who created it , the 
board may have access to decryption in case of death 
or termination of the employee . When there is need for 
monitoring the content of encrypted e-mail, it can also 
be justifiable custody of keys. However, for most 
applications, custodial key is a disadvantage. 
Another point unfavourable to identity -based 
model is the need for a secure channel for distribution of 
secret keys. If delivery occurs in networked and remote 
environment, it is necessary to ensure mutual 
authentication and delivery with secrecy. 
Another concern that one must have in identity -
based model is the possibility of identity revocation. If 
the secret key of a user is compromised, its identity 
should be repealed. Therefore, it is not recommended to 
simply use the number of CPF or mobile phone, for 
example, as a user identifier. 
c) Additional features  
As noted by [1], the identity -based model is 
ideal for groups of users, such as executives of a 
multinational company or branch of a bank, once the 
headquarters of these corporations can serve as system 
authority in all trust. Applications small scale, where the 
cost of deploying and maintaining an ICP are 
prohibitive, are candidates for the use of identity -based 
model. When the disadvantages cited above are not 
critical, the characteristics model allow interesting 
implementations. 
Some examples of services with time availability 
confidential document that can be revealed to the press 
or to a particular group , only from certain date and time 
; bids an auction that should be kept secret until the end 
of negotiations ; or view a film that should be enabled 
only within the rental period contracted. 
The identity -based model has also been the 
subject of studies in search for alternatives to SSL / TLS, 
to Web applications, as shown in [ 7 ]. With the 
elimination of certificates the process of distributing 
public keys and access control will be simplified. 
Similarly, the model has been explored to provide 
security in a number of other application areas , such as 
grid computing and sensor networks (see for example 
[5 ] and [8 ] ) and other applications. 
IV. PAIRINGS 
A pairing and a pair of mapping linearly 
independent points of an elliptic curve elements of a 
finite field is not cyclic. We denote the pairing of two 
points P and Q e(P, Q). The properties listed below are 
very interesting for cryptographic applications, are 
present both in pairing as Weil pairing Tate: 
•  Identity: Pairing a pair of matched points and 
mapped to the neutral element of the underlying 
finite field  
•  Bilinearidade: Data three points P, Q, R, pairing P + 
Q and R and the multiplication of the P and R 
pairing by pairing Q and R. This property is the most 
important of all, because through it we get the 
following: 
• e(P,nQ) = e(P,Q)n = e(nP,Q) 
•  Do not degeneration: If P and Q are linearly 
independent, so their pairing and distinct from the 
neutral element of the underlying finite field. 
•  Efficiency: data any two points, its pairing can be 
calculated efficiently by a computer. 
a) Tate Pairing  
K is an integer such that Fqk contains the n nth 
roots of unity. Pairing Tate and defined through the 
following mapping: 
e : E[n] × E/nE → Fqk/(Fqk )n 
where E [n] are the points P of the curve such that nP = 
∞.The Tate pairing can be calculated as e(P, Q) = g (D) 
where D and a divider point Q associated with a function 
whose rational divider n[P] - n [∞]. The Miller algorithm 
[Mil04] can be used to calculate the function g. 
Menezes, Okamoto, and Vanstone [6] pairings 
used to perform a transformation of an elliptic curve 
© 2016   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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points super singular to elements of a finite field 
generated by the unitary roots of unity. This 
transformation has allowed a large reduction in the 
difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem for these 
curves. 
Sakai, Ohgishi and Kasahara [8] made possible 
the construction of a ciframento protocol based on 
identities using pairings, this solved the problem 
proposed by Shamir in his article. 
V. PROPOSED SCHEME 
Now we can describe in detail the proposed 
scheme.  
Configuration: Given k, the PKG singles groups of 
bilinear maps, G1, G2 and Gt, of prime order p> 2k 
generators Q ∈ G2 ,P=Ø(Q) ∈ G1 ,g=e(P,Q) ∈ Gt Select 
s random belonging to Z*p a public key of Qpub = SQ ∈ 
G2 system summary cryptographic functions H1, H2 and 
H3. 
Generation of key pair: For an identity ID, the private key 
and SID =
1
𝐻𝐻1(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)+𝑆𝑆  Q∈G2. 
Encryption: Given a message M , the identity of the 
sender IDr and the identity of the recipient IDd, random x 
is used belonging to Z*p to calculate  
r=gx ,C=M ⊕ H3 ( r) and h =H2 (M,r). 
It is estimated S=(x + h) 𝜑𝜑 (SID ) and T  = x(HT (IDr )P + 
𝜑𝜑(Qpub).  
The cipher text and the triple (c, S, T). 
Deciphering and verification: Given the triple (c, S, T) 
and the identity of the IDR sender is calculated as  
r = e(T, SIDd), M = c ⊕ H3 (r) and h = H2 (M, r). 
Accept message if r = e(S, H-1 (IDr)Q+Qpub)g-h, in which 
case the message M and signature (h, S) are returned. 
VI. REVIEW 
This proposed scheme is interesting because 
their safety was demonstrated by Barreto semantically, 
in order to not be subject to attacks that occur when 
they are used some optimizations of Weil and Tate 
pairings. Also, please note that the simple junction of 
the features of this scheme and signature represents a 
gain of security. 
But there is a problem that has not been 
discussed, which is the abrogation of the private key. 
This question this open and represents a major problem 
for the security of any key establishment protocol, 
because the User can and should change your private 
key regularly. The problem is in the fact that the private 
key calculation is deterministic, that is, given the master 
key sea identity ID, the algorithm always returns the 
same private key. As the public key and the very identity, 
the User can not change your identity to obtain a new 
private key, and needed some other solution. Other 
asymmetric encryption schemes do not have this 
problem because the public key is published and 
revoked with its corresponding private key. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this work it was possible to see that 
cryptosystems based on Identities are very interesting 
and represent an area of research that is growing. 
However the joint utilization of digital certificates and 
Identity-Based Protocols can be even more interesting 
as these two possible solutions to the problem of 
ensuring association between public key and its owner 
seem to be complementary. 
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